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In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions among trade
unions, the central bank and the ﬁscal policymaker. We explicitly
model trade unions’ concern for public expenditure, paving the way
for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the
ﬁscal policymaker and the trade unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist
or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of
European countries in the last few decades. We also show that central
bank conservatism or administrative ceilings on public expenditure
may be ineﬀective, as tax rates and real wage claims are strategic
substitutes.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions among trade unions, the
central bank and the ﬁscal policymaker. We explicitly model trade unions’
concern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential
gains from cooperation between the ﬁscal policymaker and the trade unions,
i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic
policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. Following
Burda (1997), we deﬁne corporatism as a set of rules of the game, i.e. in-
stitutional arrangements that involve negotiation, bargaining, collaboration,
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1and accord between major economic groupings in a society, and especially
between unions and governments. Thus corporatism provides the commit-
ment technology necessary to enforce cooperative agreements between the
trade-unions and the ﬁscal policymaker.
In their golden age (the 1970s and early 1980s) social pacts sought to trade
wage moderation for higher public expenditure (namely welfare expenditure)
or lower inﬂation (namely after the oil shocks).1 Earlier empirical studies
pointed out that corporatist economies post better performance in terms of
inﬂation and unemployment (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Calmfors and Driﬃll,
1988) but higher levels of taxation. In recent decades there have been rather
conspicuous changes in European industrial relations. Since 1987, when the
ﬁrst of ﬁve multi-annual pacts was stipulated in Ireland, there have been
numerous formal or informal agreements of a corporatist nature in practically
all European countries, with the major exceptions of Belgium, France and —
a tl e a s tu n t i lt h ee n do ft h ed e c a d e—G e r m a n y .B u tt h es o c i a lp a c t so ft h el a s t
ﬁfteen years or so appear to diﬀer from earlier ones in at least one important
respect, since they establish reductions — rather than increases — in public
expenditure and government action to protect employment and labor rights
(Regini, 1997; Visser, 2002). Cooperation between governments and trade
unions is thus continuing in a number of European countries and not only
in those with a tradition of social-democratic government. Corporatism now
has a diﬀerent face, as it involves a reduction in the level of state intervention.
Theoretical analyses of macroeconomic outcomes in corporatist economies
are relatively scarce. In the 1980s, Cameron (1984) and Tarantelli (1986 and
1987), among others, argued that cooperatively determined wages can ensure
the same disposable income for wage earners while resulting in a higher level
of employment and a lower inﬂation rate. Summers et al. (1993) pointed out
that in corporatist economies interdependence between monopolistic unions
and ﬁscal policymakers limits the distortionary eﬀects of taxes, inducing an
exchange between public expenditure increases and wage restraint. More
recent contributions suggest that cooperation may improve macroeconomic
performance. However the analysis is restricted to the interaction between
trade-union behavior and monetary policy.2 In this paper we revisit the
case for corporatist agreements in a model where labor markets are union-
ized, the government controls the ﬁscal stance, and an independent central
bank sets monetary policy. We can then analyze the scope for a political
1Unionized labor markets and a pervasive welfare system have long been the hallmark
of European corporatist economies (OECD, 1997; Traxler and Kittel, 2000; and Rhodes,
2001).
2See Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Burda (1997), Acocella and Ciccarone (1995),
Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004), Acocella et al. (2004), and Di Bartolomeo (2004).
2exchange between public expenditure and wage setting choices, showing that
corporatism may generate quite diﬀerent macroeconomic outcomes from the
traditional exchange between wage restraint and high public expenditure. In
fact our model can easily encompass both ﬁrst and second-generation corpo-
ratist agreements.
Our approach stands in sharp contrast with those in the literature on
macroeconomic policy games, where the importance of institutional arrange-
ments in shaping macroeconomic outcomes is a key ingredient, but the focus
is restricted to institutional constraints on policymakers. Typically, cen-
tral bank conservatism and institutional constraints on ﬁscal discretion are
deemed to enhance macroeconomic eﬃciency, i.e. to produce lower output
distortions and inﬂation. For instance, Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998, im-
plicitly or explicitly assume a given labor market performance and neglect
interactions between this market and ﬁscal and monetary policies. Some
analyses do in fact endogenize trade-union behavior but focus on monetary
policy as the sole tool available for stabilization purposes. Contributions in
this vein emphasize that the central banker’s idiosyncratic preferences, ei-
ther conservative or populist, can have a whipping eﬀect on union behavior,
thus inducing a reduction in output distortions.3 In the paper we show that
in unionized economies attempts to reduce ﬁscal distortions either through
central bank conservatism or by imposing institutional constraints directly
on the ﬁscal policymaker may be ineﬀective, as the potential output beneﬁts
from ﬁscal discipline are oﬀset by higher increased real wages.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our model
and derive the equilibrium values of the relevant variables. In section 3
we compare the outcomes of cooperative and non-cooperative regimes and
derive a number of propositions on the superiority of corporatism. Section 4
concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
To start with, we model the production function of the representative ﬁrm:
Y = Lη,w h e r eL is labor (Alesina and Tabellini, 1987; Beetsma and Boven-
berg, 1998). The ﬁrm maximizes net proﬁts: PL η (1 − t) − WL,w h e r eP is
the price level, W and t are the wage and the tax rate respectively. After
straightforward manipulations4 we obtain the following expression
x = π − π
e − t − ˜ x (1)
3See Cukierman (2004) for a review.
4For a derivation of equation (1), see the Appendix A.
3where output deviations from the competitive non-distortionary baseline
level, x, are caused by tax distortions, real wage distortions due to mo-
nopolistic unions, ˜ x,5 and inﬂation surprises, π − πe (πe deﬁnes inﬂation
expectations).
In this economy there are three players: the government, the monopoly
trade union, and the central bank.
T h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ sl o s sf u n c t i o ni sd e ﬁned over inﬂation, output and public







2 + αgf (g − ˜ g)
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(2)
As in Debelle and Fischer (1994), ˜ g is interpreted as the optimal share
of non-distortionary output to be spent on public goods if non-distortionary
lump-sum taxes were available. In setting the public expenditures level, the
government faces a balanced budget constraint:6
g = t (3)
The trade union’s loss function is




βgu(g − ˜ g)2
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(4)
The union’s welfare increases with the real wage but falls with output dis-
tortions (see Cukierman, 2004, for an extensive survey of the literature). The
assumption that the trade union is concerned with expenditure deviations
from the target is perhaps less straightforward and requires some discus-
sion. In fact union members may be concerned with speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t so f
public expenditures, such as pension funds, training schemes, unemployment
beneﬁts, health insurance for workers, social policies, labor policy, and any
government action in the area of income distribution. We assume that the
monopolistic union sets the labor market distortion, i.e. a real-wage mark-up
over the competitive rate. The loss functions (2) and (4) will diﬀer insofar
as the government takes the preferences of non-workers into account (as in
Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998).7
5More precisely, e x is deﬁned as the real wage mark-up over the competitive wage rate,
which is exogenously given (see Appendix A).
6For the sake of simplicity we do not consider either the seigniorage component of the
budget or debt service payments.
7For the sake of simplicity we assume that the public expenditure targets in eq. (2)
and (4) are identical.
4Monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank (CB hence-
forth), which is interested in minimizing both the inﬂation rate and output









where απm >α πf. We assume that the CB directly controls the inﬂation
rate.
3 The non-cooperative solution
The timing of the game is as follows. The union and the government simulta-
neously set labor and tax distortions. After that, the CB chooses monetary
policy. The model is solved by backward induction. In Appendix C we extend
our results to the case where the government action follows the union wage-
setting decision. A graphical characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium
is provided in ﬁgures 1 and 2 below.
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∂t = −1+ 1
(1+απm)
The government anticipates the CB’s reaction to its tax policy, such that
inﬂation will increase following a rise in the tax rate. However, the govern-
ment cannot internalize the adverse eﬀect of taxation on expectations, as in
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998). Hence taxes will be set as if the inﬂation
response could partly oﬀset output distortions. Furthermore, the government
cannot internalize the trade-union reaction to his tax policy.
From equation (4), minimized with respect to the real wage mark-up,8
we obtain the trade-union ﬁrst order condition:
−β˜ x − x =0 (8)
8Correspondingly, the nominal wage rate, ln(W)=e x+πe, will incorporate the expec-
tation of π.
5Although the union has a public expenditure target, the real wage is set
conditionally only on its direct impact on the level of output.
By imposing the rational expectations constraint, π = πe ,w ea r ea b l et o
solve the model
x
N = −β˜ x (9)
˜ x
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Output distortions are policy invariant (see eq. (9)): given the tax rate,
the trade union will set the real wage distortion at a level such that (8)
holds. As a consequence, labor and tax distortions are complete substitutes:
the output eﬀe c to fat a xc h a n g ei sf u l l yo ﬀset by a real wage adjustment in
the opposite direction (see eq. (10)). The more the union is concerned with
t h er e a lw a g eo bj e c t i v e ,t h el o w e rt h et a xr a t e( e q .1 1 ) .I nf a c tw ec a n n o tr u l e
out the case where the government chooses to subsidize production (gN < 0).
Our results stand in sharp contrast with those obtained in models where
labor market distortions are exogenous. First of all, production subsidies are
often seen as a remedy to labor market distortions in models that treat such
distortions as exogenous (Alesina and Tabellini, 1987; Dixit and Lambertini,
2003). In fact our model shows that instead of raising production the subsidy
would trigger a real wage increase. Second, the expenditure bias identiﬁed in
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) has no impact on output distortions, which
are independent of ﬁscal policy.
3.1 The cooperative solution
Non-cooperation implies three sources of ineﬃciency related to the timing of
the game and the existence of externalities. First, the government cannot
internalize the impact of its actions on inﬂation expectations. Second, the
government does not internalize the real wage reaction to its tax policy, such
that in equilibrium ∂x
∂t =0 . Third, the trade union neglects the adverse
eﬀects of its actions on the level of public expenditure.
As usual, cooperation is deﬁned as the joint minimization of a convex
combination of the diﬀerence between the two players’ loss functions and their
outside options, i.e. the generalized Nash product
¡
G − GN¢φ ¡
U − UN¢(1−φ)
with φ ∈ [0,1]. For our purposes, a graphical analysis is exhaustive. Before
6analyzing the cooperative solution, it is useful to identify the two players’
preferred combinations of expenditure gap and output. For the government,
these are:9
¡











Conditions (13) and (14) imply that e x =0 . Moreover, they are obtained
by requiring the policymaker to take into account the adverse eﬀect of taxes
on inﬂation expectations.
The trade union’s preferred combinations of expenditure gap and output
are:
¡








N = −β˜ x (16)
gUSB is determined by the union desired trade-oﬀ between public expendi-
tures and the real wage.
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consider only the following cases:10
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˜ g − g
USB¢
(18)
irrespectively of the relative size of gGSB. In fact, from our discussion it will
be intuitively clear that a complete taxonomy would add no further insight.
If condition (17) holds, both the government and the union beneﬁtf r o m ¡
e g − gC¢
<
¡
˜ g − gN¢
, where superscript C identiﬁes cooperative outcomes.
In ﬁgure 1, the loci RG and RU identify the two players’ reaction functions,
and points Σ, Ω deﬁne the outcomes11 preferred by the government and the
trade union respectively. Hence points N and S respectively identify the Nash
9See Appendix B for a derivation.
10Both conditions (17) and (18) imply xGSB >x N.
11Note that point Σ m u s tl i ea b o v et h el o c u sRG. This is because, for any level of output
distortions, the government internalizes the adverse eﬀect of taxes on inﬂation expectations
and chooses a lower level of public expenditure (see the appendix for a discussion).
7and Stackelberg equilibria. It is worth noting with regard to the Stackelberg
equilibrium that in this case the trade-union policy will internalize the trade
oﬀ between the real wage mark-up and public expenditure.12
Cooperative equilibria lie within the feasibility set,a l o n gt h eCuCg seg-
ment of the contract curve.13 Cooperation entails a reduction in both output
distortions and the public expenditure gap. This, in turn, implies that the
trade union is willing to discipline wage claims in order to beneﬁtf r o ma n
increase in expenditure.
Figure 1
By contrast, when condition (18) holds, cooperation entails a larger ex-
penditure gap and a reduction in output distortions. In this case the trade
union beneﬁts from a real wage increase, but such increase is suﬃciently
moderate to leave the government better oﬀ despite the fall in expenditures
(see ﬁgure 2).
Figure 2
Summarizing, our model is consistent with both the old and new forms
of social pact. If
¡
˜ g − gUSB¢
<
¡
˜ g − gN¢
t h eg o v e r n m e n tw i l la g r e et or e d u c e
the public expenditure gap (i.e., it will raise public expenditure) in exchange
for wage moderation as in the golden age social pacts mentioned in the intro-
duction. By contrast, if
¡
˜ g − gUSB¢
>
¡
˜ g − gN¢
t h eg o v e r n m e n ta g r e e sf o r
a moderate wage rise in exchange for an increase in the public expenditure
gap, i.e., a reduction in taxation. The former outcome is consistent with the
ﬁrst generation of social pacts (those of the 1970s). The latter seems to be
in line with the second generation of social pacts (from the 1990s).
3.2 Political shifts
In section 3.1 we characterized the possible cooperative solutions conditional
on the sign of gN−gUSB. For instance, when non cooperation results in public
expenditure above the trade union’s preferred level, the cooperative solution
entails a reduction in public expenditure and an increase in the wage rate.
The result holds for any level of gGSB. Here, we discuss the consequences
of changes in gGSB − ˜ g due to variations in αgf. This enables us to discuss
12Note that, due to the Beetsma and Bovenberg eﬀect on tax policy, the CB’s preferences
(απm), which aﬀect the slope of the government reaction function, also aﬀect the output
distortion. The government reaction function is described in Appendix B.
13In this case we consider the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium as the outside option
of the players in the cooperative Nash solution. In the Stackelberg case, the feasibility set
has to be computed by considering a diﬀerent outside option.
8the impact of the political cycle on the nature of social pacts between the
policymaker and the union.
Af a l li nαgf, i.e. a political shift to the right, produces an increase in
both ˜ g − gGSB and in the slope of the government reaction function RG
(see Appendix B). Figure 3 describes a polarized system, where a political
s h i f tr e v e r s e st h en a t u r eo ft h eexchange that characterizes the cooperative
solution. Points NLW and NRW describe Nash equilibria under left- and
right-wing parties, respectively, for given trade union preferences. Coopera-
tion between the right-wing government and the union involves a traditional
exchange between wage restraint and public expenditure laxitysm. By con-
trast, cooperation between the left-wing government and the union entails a
reduction in public expenditure and a real wage increase.
The level of public expenditure is, however, still higher under a left-
wing government, thus conﬁrming a central tenet of the political economy
literature, i.e. public expenditure is systematically higher under left-wing
governments.
Figure 3
Observe that in ﬁgure 3 we characterizeas i t u a t i o nw h e r eNLW entails
an expenditure gap ˜ g − gN
LW > ˜ g − gGSB
LW , which implies that the left-wing
government will accept a further decrease in expenditure in exchange for an
increase in macroeconomic eﬃciency. This rationalizes the apparent paradox
in the behavior of left-wing governments, which are sometimes criticized for
committing to policy agreements that seems to betray their fundamental
(ideological) values.
3.3 The dangers of unilateral ﬁscal retrenchments
In a number of papers14 institutional constraints on the ﬁscal stance are
shown unambiguously to improve macroeconomic performance. In these con-
tributions trade unions’ behavior is usually neglected or assumed to be ex-
ogenous. Such an assumption is not innocuous. Consider a Nash equilibrium:
from equation (10) it is easy to see that administrative ceilings on the level of
public expenditure,15 as envisaged in Alesina and Perotti (1997), would sub-
sidize the real wage, leaving output distortions unaﬀected. Therefore ﬁscal
c o n s t r a i n t sa l w a y sr e d u c ew e l f a r e .
14See, among others, Chari and Kehoe (1997), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998, 2000,
2002), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Dixit (2001), Dixit and Lambertini (2001), and Gover-
natori and Eijﬃnger (2003).
15A number of countries have adopted expenditure targets (see Danninger, 2002, for an
extensive discussion).
9A more complex picture emerges if one considers the case where unions
a c ta sal e a d e rv i sàv i st h eﬁscal policymaker (ﬁgure 4). The ceiling now
introduces a commitment to set the expenditure gap, ˜ g − g,a b o v eo re q u a l
to a certain value G. It establishes a ﬂoor for the government’s reaction
function, and hence, for the ﬁscal constraint the union faces in solving its
problem.
Figure 4
First, consider the case of an S1-type equilibrium. Deﬁne the correspond-
ing expenditure gap as ˜ g − gS1.A n yG<˜ g − gS1 would not bind. For any
G>˜ g −gS1 the binding constraint would be counterproductive: output dis-
tortion would rise to the Nash equilibrium level. This would happen because
under a ceiling the trade oﬀ between wage distortion and the public expen-
diture gap disappears. As a consequence, the union is induced to choose a
real wage mark up such that x = −β˜ x for any given expenditure gap.
Second, consider an S2-type equilibrium. For any G>˜ g − gS2 output
distortions would fall to the Nash equilibrium level. Thus, the optimally
binding ceiling should entail a marginal increase in the expenditure gap.
However, a commitment to raise expenditures would exert an identical dis-
ciplining eﬀect on the union, but with a lower expenditure gap! In fact, the
optimal constraint is a ceiling on G.T h e RG-RC line highlights the ben-
eﬁcial consequences of a “reversed ceiling” such that g > gN.I n t h i s c a s e
the ﬁscal commitment replicates the N equilibrium, mimicking the coopera-
tive solution that would exchange higher public expenditure for lower output
distortion.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have endogenized the trade union’s behavior and shown
that policy prescriptions deriving from traditional models are ineﬀective with
regard to output distortions. The ﬁrst key to our results lies in the consid-
eration that, in addition to the traditional objectives, i.e. the real wage rate
and employment, unions may be interested in the level of public expendi-
ture. The second key lies in our re-examination of corporatism as a feasi-
ble set of institutional arrangements designed to internalize certain negative
macroeconomic externalities and to provide a positive solution to them as an
alternative to the punishment suggested by much of the previous literature.
The third key is the characterization of the government budget as a two-
faced Janus, i.e. in its double role of providing public expenditure valuable
for union members and extracting distortionary taxes. This characterization
of the budget makes our model consistent with the observed evolution of
10social pacts in recent decades, which appear to move from an exchange be-
tween wage moderation and higher public expenditure to one between wage
moderation and lower public expenditure.
Our analysis has signiﬁcant implications for the current debate on insti-
tutional reforms in Europe. Discussion of the reform of the Stability and
Growth Pact fails to consider its impact on labor market performance. Our
paper suggests that when the interdependence between ﬁscal policy and the
labor market is considered, any strategy of placing an outside cap on pub-
lic expenditure is doomed to be counterproductive. In one case a commit-
ment to raise expenditures would even be preferable to a restrictive ceiling!
By contrast, corporatist institutions should be regarded as valuable tools
in enhancing macroeconomic performance, in line with the Lisbon Strategy
approach, which emphasizes the role of social partnership.
Some authors see the commitment to ﬁscal restraint as a catalyst for
labor market reforms that should reduce the power of unions. In this vein,
the complete liberalization of the labor market would be a complementary
solution to the Stability and Growth Pact. However, the risks should be
clear. On the one hand, the Calmfors and Driﬃll hump-shaped curve (1998)
suggests that corporatist agreements are likely to dominate partial labor
market liberalization. On the other hand, complete decentralization may be
politically unfeasible.
Appendix A — Output function
The representative price-taking ﬁrm maximizes its net proﬁt:
P (1 − t)Y − WL
subject to the technology constraint Y = La.
The ﬁrst order (log)-condition is:
a
1 − a
(lna + p − w − t)=y








Without loss of generality we assume that full-employment real output is
¯ y = a




(p − w − t)
11where x = y − ¯ y is the real output gap.
By assuming that the union determines the real distortion ˜ x = w − p






e − t − ˜ x)
As usual, for the sake of exposition, in the main text we consider the
following equation as Phillips curve:
x = π − π
e − t − ˜ x
that has the same properties of the previous one.
Appendix B — Figure outcomes
In this appendix we derive the iso-losses and reaction functions depicted in
the ﬁgures (i.e. in the space (x,g − ˜ g)).
The union’s reaction function is derived from equation (8) in the text.
The iso-loss curves are directly obtained from equation (4) by using (1):




βgu(g − e g)2
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The government’s reaction function is:





and its iso-loss is:
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16The union can set the real distortions in the labor market, but it does not know the
price level. Thus, more correctly, it should be said that the union sets the post-forecasting
real wage distortion. Note also that given the static nature of the model, inﬂation equals
the price level, i.e. π = p.
12Appendix C — Stackelberg solution
The non-cooperative Stackelberg solution is derived by ﬁr s ts o l v i n gt h eg o v -
ernment problem, obtaining the following ﬁrst order condition:
t =





and then solving the union problem, which yields:
˜ x =





gf (1 + απm)
2 + βgu(α2
πm + απf)
2β˜ x − ˜ g
The corresponding equilibrium outcomes (point S in the ﬁgures) are:
t = g =˜ g −
(απf + α2
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